
**Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction**

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Geneva, 6–10 December 2010

Report of the Meeting of States Parties

I. Introduction

1. The Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC/CONF.VI/6), in the Decisions and Recommendations section, contained the following decision:

“The Conference decides:

- (a) To hold four annual meetings of the States Parties of one week duration each year commencing in 2007, prior to the Seventh Review Conference, to be held not later than the end of 2011, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on:
 - (i) Ways and means to enhance national implementation, including enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions;
 - (ii) Regional and sub-regional cooperation on implementation of the Convention;
 - (iii) National, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins;
 - (iv) Oversight, education, awareness raising and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention;
 - (v) With a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases: (1) for States Parties in need of assistance, identifying requirements and requests for capacity enhancement; and (2) from States Parties in a position to do so, and international organizations, opportunities for providing assistance related to these fields;

- (vi) Provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems.
 - (b) Each meeting of the States Parties will be prepared by a one week meeting of experts. The topics for consideration at each annual meeting of States Parties will be as follows: items (i) and (ii) will be considered in 2007; items (iii) and (iv) in 2008; item (v) in 2009; and item (vi) in 2010. The first meeting will be chaired by a representative of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States, the second by a representative of the Eastern European Group, the third by a representative of the Western Group, and the fourth by a representative of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States.
 - (c) The meetings of experts will prepare factual reports describing their work;
 - (d) All meetings, both of experts and of States Parties, will reach any conclusions or results by consensus;
 - (e) The Seventh Review Conference will consider the work and outcome of these meetings and decide on any further action.”
2. The 2009 Meeting of States Parties decided that the 2010 Meeting of Experts would be held in Geneva from 23 to 27 August 2010, and that the 2010 Meeting of States Parties would be held in Geneva from 6 to 10 December 2010, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference.
3. By resolution 64/70, adopted without a vote on 2 December 2009, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences including all assistance to the annual meetings of the States Parties and the meetings of experts.
4. The 2010 Meeting of Experts convened in Geneva from 23 to 27 August 2010. At its closing meeting on 27 August 2010, the Meeting of Experts adopted its Report by consensus (BWC/MSP/2010/MX/3).

II. Organization of the Meeting of States Parties

5. In accordance with the decision of the 2009 Meeting of States Parties, the 2010 Meeting of States Parties was convened at the Palais des Nations in Geneva from 6 to 10 December 2010, under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Pedro Oyarce of Chile.
6. At its first meeting, on 6 December 2010, the Meeting of States Parties adopted its agenda (BWC/MSP/2010/1) and programme of work (BWC/MSP/2010/3) as proposed by the Chairman. The Chairman also drew the attention of delegations to two reports: the report of the Implementation Support Unit (BWC/MSP/2010/2) and a report on universalization activities prepared by the Chairman (BWC/MSP/2010/4).
7. At the same meeting, following a suggestion by the Chairman, the Meeting of States Parties adopted as its rules of procedure, *mutatis mutandis*, the rules of procedure of the Sixth Review Conference, as contained in Annex II of the Final Document of the Review Conference (BWC/CONF.VI/6).
8. Mr. Richard Lennane, Head of the Implementation Support Unit, served as Secretary of the Meeting of States Parties. Mr. Piers Millett, Political Affairs Officer, Implementation

Support Unit, served as Deputy Secretary. Ms. Ngoc Phuong Huynh, Associate Political Affairs Officer, Implementation Support Unit, served in the Secretariat.

III. Participation at the Meeting of States Parties

9. Ninety-two States Parties to the Convention participated in the Meeting of States Parties as follows: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen.

10. In addition, four states that had signed the Convention but had not yet ratified it participated in the Meeting of States Parties without taking part in the making of decisions, as provided for in rule 44, paragraph 1, of the rules of procedure: Burundi, Egypt, Haiti, Myanmar.

11. One state, Israel, neither party nor signatory to the Convention, participated in the Meeting of States Parties as an observer, in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 2 (a).

12. The United Nations, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), attended the Meeting of States Parties in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 3.

13. The European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) were granted observer status to participate in the Meeting of States Parties in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 4.

14. Twelve non-governmental organizations and research institutes attended the Meeting of States Parties under rule 44, paragraph 5.

15. A list of all participants in the Meeting of States Parties is contained in document BWC/MSP/2010/INF.2 and Add.1.

IV. Work of the Meeting of States Parties

16. In accordance with the programme of work (BWC/MSP/2010/3), the Meeting of States Parties held a general debate in which the following 29 States Parties made statements: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium (on behalf of the European Union), Brazil, Canada (on behalf of JACKSNNZ¹), Chile, China, Cuba (on

¹ An informal grouping comprising Japan, Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand.

behalf of the Group of the Non-aligned Movement and Other States), Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Serbia, South Africa, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, United States of America. One observer organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), also made a statement in the general debate. Following the general debate, during an informal session the Meeting heard statements from 12 non-governmental organisations and research institutes.

17. Between 7 and 9 December, the Meeting of States Parties held a number of working sessions devoted to consideration of the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems (agenda item 6). On 7 December, one working session was devoted to arrangements for the Seventh Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee in 2011 (agenda item 9), and on 9 December, one working session was devoted to reports from the Chairman and States Parties on universalization activities (agenda item 7) and the report of the Implementation Support Unit (agenda item 8).

18. In the course of its work, the Meeting of States Parties was able to draw on a number of working papers submitted by States Parties, as well as on statements and presentations made by States Parties, international organizations and the Implementation Support Unit, which were circulated in the Meeting.

19. On the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, States Parties recognized that this is an issue that has health and security components, at both the national and international levels. States Parties highlighted the importance of pursuing initiatives in this area through effective cooperation and sustainable partnerships. States Parties noted the importance of ensuring that efforts undertaken are effective irrespective of whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or deliberately caused, and cover diseases and toxins that could harm humans, animals, plants or the environment. States Parties also recognised that capabilities to detect, quickly and effectively respond to, and recover from the alleged use of a biological or toxin weapon need to be in place before they are required.

20. Recognising that developing effective measures for the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant international organizations to respond to the use of a biological or toxin weapon is a complex task, States Parties noted the following challenges:

- (a) the need for clear procedures for submitting requests for assistance or for responding to a case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons;
- (b) the need for additional resources in the human and animal health fields, and most acutely in the area of plant health, particularly in developing countries;
- (c) the potentially complex and sensitive interface between an international public health response and international security issues; and
- (d) the public health and humanitarian imperatives of a prompt and timely response.

21. States Parties noted that there are differences among States Parties in terms of their level of development, national capabilities and resources, and that these differences affect national and international capacity to respond effectively to an alleged use of a biological or toxin weapon. States Parties, taking into account their commitments under Articles VII and X, emphasised the value of assisting other States Parties, including by:

(a) enhancing relevant capabilities, including through promoting and facilitating the generation, transfer, and acquisition upon agreed terms, of new knowledge and technologies, consistent with national law and international agreements, as well as of materials and equipment;

(b) strengthening human resources; identifying opportunities for collaborative research and sharing advances in science and technology;

(c) sharing appropriate and effective practices for biorisk standards in laboratories handling biological agents and toxins.

22. Given their commitments under the Convention, in particular under Article VII, States Parties recognized that they bear the primary responsibility for providing assistance and coordinating with relevant organizations in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. States Parties underlined the importance of assistance being provided promptly, upon request, to any State Party that has been exposed to a danger as a result of violation of the Convention. As national preparedness contributes to international capabilities and cooperation, States Parties recognised the importance of working to build their national capacities according to their specific needs and circumstances.

23. Recognizing the importance of disease surveillance and detection efforts for identifying and confirming the cause of outbreaks, States Parties recognized the need to work, in accordance with their respective circumstances, national laws and regulations, to improve their own capacities in this area, and cooperating, upon request, to build the capacity of other States Parties. This could include the development of:

(a) diagnostic capacity for relevant diseases;

(b) tools for sampling, epidemiological intelligence and investigation;

(c) diagnostic and detection techniques, tools and equipment;

(d) adequate technical expertise;

(e) international, regional and national laboratory networks;

(f) relevant standards, standard operating procedures and best practices;

(g) effective information-sharing; and

(h) cooperation, especially with developing countries, on research and development of vaccines and diagnostic reagents, and between international reference laboratories and research institutions.

24. Given the importance of investigating, and mitigating the potential impact of, an alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, States Parties noted the value of, in accordance with national laws and regulations: a coordinated government approach in emergency management; addressing the full range of possible implications; establishing clear channels of communication and command; accessing expert advice; training and exercises; adopting a communication strategy; as well as enabling coordination across sectors through the provision of sufficient financing.

25. Noting that an effective response requires efficient coordination among relevant actors, States Parties recognised the particular importance of ensuring a coordinated response from the law enforcement and health sectors. States Parties agreed on the value of working, in accordance with their national laws and regulations, to improve effective cooperation between these sectors, including by fostering mutual awareness, understanding, and improved information exchange, and by undertaking joint training activities.

26. On the role to be played by the Convention in the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations, affirming the consultation procedures agreed at

previous Review Conferences, States Parties noted that the Convention is an appropriate and capable instrument for:

- (a) bilateral, regional or multilateral consultations for the provision of prompt and timely assistance, prior to an allegation of use being presented to the Security Council;
- (b) developing clearer and more detailed procedures for submitting requests for assistance, and for promptly providing assistance following an allegation of use; and
- (c) developing a comprehensive range of information on sources of assistance, and/or a mechanism to request assistance.

27. The States Parties recalled that the Sixth Review Conference took note of desires expressed that, should a request for assistance be made, it be promptly considered and an appropriate response provided, and that in this context, pending consideration of a decision by the Security Council, timely emergency assistance could be provided by States Parties if requested.

28. States Parties noted the role played by relevant international organisations, in close cooperation and coordination with the States Parties under the provisions of the Convention, in the provision of assistance and coordination, including, *inter alia*, the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, the World Customs Organization, and the International Criminal Police Organization. States Parties noted the value of encouraging these organizations to work together more closely, strictly within their respective mandates, to address specific relevant aspects of the threats posed by the use of biological and toxin weapons, and to assist States Parties to build their national capacities.

29. The States Parties noted the importance of effectively investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, using appropriate expertise, both from experts and laboratories, and taking into account developments in biological science and technology. The States Parties reaffirmed the relevant mechanism established by Article VI of the Convention and noted that the Secretary-General's investigation mechanism, set out in A/44/561 and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 45/57, represents an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. Recognizing the various views on this issue, the States Parties noted that the Seventh Review Conference would consider it further.

30. The States Parties noted that the International Health Regulations (2005) are important for building capacity to prevent, protect against, control and respond to the international spread of disease. The States Parties noted that such aims are complementary with the objectives of the Convention.

31. The States Parties further considered that in pursuing the above understandings and actions, States Parties could, according to their respective circumstances and constitutional and legal processes, take into account the considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions made by delegations on the topic under discussion at the Meeting of Experts, as contained in Annex I of the Report of the Meeting of Experts (BWC/MSP/2010/MX/3), as well as the synthesis of these considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals contained in BWC/MSP/2010/L.1, which is attached to this report as Annex I. This annex was not proposed for adoption as an outcome of the Meeting, and therefore was not discussed with that aim. Thus, the annex was not agreed upon and consequently has no status.

32. States Parties are encouraged to inform the Seventh Review Conference of, *inter alia*, any actions, measures or other steps that they may have taken on the basis of the discussions at the 2010 Meeting of Experts and the outcome of the 2010 Meeting of States

Parties, in order to facilitate the Seventh Review Conference's consideration of the work and outcome of these meetings and its decision on any further action, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference (BWC/CONF.VI/6, Part III, paragraph 7 (e)).

33. The Meeting of States Parties reviewed progress towards obtaining universality for the Convention and considered the Report from the Chairman on Universalization Activities (BWC/MSP/2010/4), as well as reports from States Parties on their activities to promote universalization. The States Parties reaffirmed the particular importance of the ratification of the Convention by signatory states and accession to the Convention without delay by those which have not signed the Convention, contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. In this context, the Meeting took note of the reports, and called on all States Parties to continue to promote universalization, and to support the universalization activities of the Chairman and the Implementation Support Unit, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference.

34. The Meeting of States Parties considered the Report of the Implementation Support Unit (BWC/MSP/2010/2), including the report on participation in the confidence-building measures (CBMs). The Meeting took note of the Report, and expressed its satisfaction with the work of the Implementation Support Unit. The Meeting noted with satisfaction that participation in the confidence-building measures had increased to the highest level ever, but expressed concern that more than half the States Parties had not participated. The Meeting encouraged all States Parties to make an annual CBM submission in accordance with the decisions of the respective Review Conferences, seeking assistance through the Implementation Support Unit where required. The Meeting called on States Parties to continue working closely with the Implementation Support Unit in fulfilling its mandate, in accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference.

35. The Meeting of States Parties considered the arrangements for the Seventh Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee in 2011. The Meeting decided that the Review Conference would be held in Geneva from 5 to 22 December 2011 and that the Preparatory Committee would be held in Geneva from 13 to 15 April 2011. The Meeting approved the nomination by the Western Group of Ambassador Paul van den IJssel of the Netherlands as President of the Review Conference and Chairman of the Preparatory Committee. The Meeting also approved the estimated costs for the Review Conference and the Preparatory Committee, as set out in document BWC/MSP/2010/5/Rev.1.

V. Documentation

36. A list of official documents of the Meeting of States Parties, including the working papers submitted by States Parties, is contained in Annex II to this Report. All documents on this list are available on the Implementation Support Unit website at <http://www.unog.ch/bwc> and through the United Nations Official Document System (ODS), at <http://documents.un.org>.

VI. Conclusion of the Meeting of States Parties

37. At its closing meeting on 10 December 2010, the Meeting of States Parties adopted its Report by consensus, as contained in document BWC/MSP/2010/CRP.1, as orally amended, to be issued as document BWC/MSP/2010/6.

Annex I

Synthesis of considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topic under discussion at the Meeting of Experts

I. Aims and challenges

1. Recognizing that the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons is an issue that has both health and security components at both the national and international levels, and should therefore be pursued by States Parties and other relevant actors as a joint venture to ensure global safety and security, States Parties should work to ensure that:

(a) Efforts undertaken are effective irrespective of whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or deliberately caused;

(b) Diseases and toxins that could harm humans, animals, plants or the environment are all covered;

(c) The provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations involves all relevant stakeholders at local, national, regional and international levels;

(d) Capabilities are in place before they are needed to detect, quickly and effectively respond to, and recover from the alleged use of a biological or toxin weapon;

(e) Effective and sustainable partnerships are built between developed and developing countries, between developed and developed countries, and between developing and developing countries.

2. Recognizing that developing effective measures for the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations to respond to the use of a biological or toxin weapon is a complex task, States Parties should consider how best to respond to the following challenges:

(a) The lack of clear procedures for submitting requests for assistance or for responding to a case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons;

(b) The political aspects of situations in which there may be use or alleged use of biological or toxin weapons;

(c) Lack of resources in the human and animal health fields, and most acutely in the area of plant health, particularly in developing countries;

(d) The significant differences between responding to a natural outbreak of disease and an outbreak resulting from hostile use of a biological agent or toxin;

(e) The time lag between recognising an outbreak of disease and establishing whether or not the outbreak was intentional;

(f) The potentially complex and sensitive interface between an international public health response and international security issues;

(g) An employer's duty of care when deploying staff to a potentially contaminated environment.

II. Building national capacity

3. Recognising that there are differences among States Parties in terms of their level of development, national capabilities and resources, that these differences affect national and international capacity to respond to an alleged use of a biological or toxin weapon, and that national preparedness contributes to international capabilities and cooperation, States Parties, in a position to do so should assist other States Parties, including by:

(a) Enhancing relevant capabilities, including through transfers of know-how and voluntary intellectual property rights;

(b) Strengthening human resources through frequent seminars, international workshops and courses, as well as training, simulations, sharing of experiences and best practices;

(c) Identifying opportunities for collaborative research, such as on detection equipment or in fundamental and translational research, as well as opportunities for the transfer of relevant technologies;

(d) Sharing advances in science and technology, such as portable detectors; personal protective equipment; new vaccines; more effective drugs; and modern decontamination equipment.

(e) Identifying and resolving legal, regulatory, and other barriers to effective multilateral cooperation, such as: inconsistent standards for forensic identification of agents; vaccine liability; and licensing for emergency use of medical countermeasures;

(f) Providing assistance immediately to any State Party, upon request, that has been exposed to a danger as a result of the use, or alleged use, of any biological or toxin weapon.

4. Recognizing that, given their commitments under the Convention, States Parties bear the primary responsibility for providing assistance and coordinating with relevant organizations in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, and that national preparedness contributes to international capabilities and cooperation, States Parties should work to build their national capacities according to their specific needs and circumstances, including by:

(a) Developing and maintaining national action and contingency plans for dealing with the use of biological or toxin weapons, possibly making use of an all hazards approach,

(b) Developing procedures and practices to assess national needs in the case of an alleged use of a biological or toxin weapons, and to communicate these needs quickly, clearly and effectively to the international community;

(c) Strengthening, maintaining and regularly reviewing relevant health and security structures, capacities, human resources and standard operating procedures, including in the areas of first aid, triage, evacuation and treatment; vaccines; decontamination capacity; personnel screening; securing water and food supplies; personal protective equipment; collecting, transporting, and testing samples; and operating in contaminated locations;

(d) Assuming responsibility for the safety and security of all biological materials and facilities in their territory or under their control.

5. Recognizing the importance of disease detection and surveillance efforts and rapid and accurate diagnostic services for detecting, identifying and confirming the cause of

outbreaks, States Parties should work to ensure that their own capacities and those of other States Parties include:

- (a) Capability to identify novel, emerging, re-emerging or exotic diseases, as well as well-known infectious diseases;
- (b) Use of rapid chemical and biological detection techniques (both static and mobile);
- (c) Modern tools for sampling, epidemiological intelligence and investigation;
- (d) Regular reviews of techniques, tools and equipment;
- (e) Support from regional collaborative networking as well as collaborations with industry and international partners.
- (f) The presence of adequate expertise, including in basic cell and molecular biology, and rapid access to advanced and specialist diagnostic laboratories that can quickly test for rare or dangerous pathogens;
- (g) High-quality diagnostics, appropriate diagnostic equipment, detailed standard operating procedures and flexible protocols;
- (h) A decentralised, resilient primary diagnostic capability, allowing for short transport distances for samples and rapid analysis;
- (i) Sharing of data and information among diagnostic laboratories;
- (j) External quality assessment of relevant facilities, including certification against international standards;
- (k) A forensic capability to provide evidence in the event of a prosecution involving the alleged use of a biological or toxin weapon.

III. Preparing effective responses

6. Recognising that the need to investigate and mitigate the potential impact of an event and to bring any perpetrators to justice, States Parties should consider:

- (a) Adopting best practices in emergency management, addressing the full range of possible implications, including: primary fatalities and injuries; secondary hazards or events; property damage; service disruption; socio-economic impact; and long-term health issues;
- (b) Establishing clear channels of communication and information flow, taking advantage, where possible, of existing arrangements;
- (c) Accessing expert advice, for both first responders and decision makers, provided in a timely and easily understandable manner and preferably from a single agreed source;
- (d) Training and exercises, both table-top and field, to validate plans and systems thoroughly, train frontline responders, and highlight vulnerabilities;
- (e) Adopting a strategy for information management, including deciding what information will reach the media and ensuring that only exact and precise information is used, in order to prevent panic or irresponsible use of information.

7. Recognising the importance of effective coordination of a response, and of fostering mutual respect and understanding, States Parties should promote regular communication

between, and joint exercises involving, all relevant stakeholders at local, national, regional and international levels, including:

- (a) government agencies;
- (b) international organizations;
- (c) academic institutions;
- (d) all operators handling high-risk materials and working in high-risk facilities;
- (e) security personnel, such as the police, defence forces, fire department, and coast guard;
- (f) the private sector, including the pharmaceutical, food, and transportation industries.

8. Recognising the particular importance of ensuring a coordinated response from the law enforcement and health sectors, States Parties should work to improve effective cooperation between these sectors, including by:

- (a) Fostering mutual awareness, understanding, and improved information exchange across the separate investigations;
- (b) Supporting a joint approach to training, contact, first response, recognition, investigation, action and communication;
- (c) Developing and implementing protocols for working together in such activities as: exchanging information; conducting risk and threat assessments; and carrying out interviews;
- (d) Using formal agreements to reinforce informal personal contacts and formalise concepts and principles for conducting joint investigations;
- (e) Establishing, in advance, boundaries between laboratory support for diagnostic purposes and for forensic work.

IV. International partners and mechanisms

9. Recognising the role played by the Convention in the provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations, States Parties noted that the Convention is an appropriate and capable body for:

- (a) Bilateral, regional or multilateral consultations prior to an allegation of use being lodged with the Security Council, and for recommending to the Security Council the best way to act in response to an allegation;
- (b) Developing clearer and more detailed procedures for submitting requests for assistance, and for promptly providing assistance following an allegation of use;
- (c) Developing a comprehensive range of information on sources of assistance, and/or a mechanism to request assistance.

10. Recognising the role of international organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, and the International Criminal Police Organization, States Parties should encourage these organizations to work together more closely, within their respective mandates, to address the threats posed by the use of biological and toxin weapons, including by:

- (a) Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of, and improving, international, regional and national laboratory networks;
- (b) Developing relevant standards, standard operating procedures and best practices;
- (c) Communicating real-time risk assessments and recommendations to States Parties;
- (d) Intensifying their efforts to help States Parties to enhance relevant capacity;
- (e) Coordinating and complementing relevant response assistance, upon request, to States Parties;
- (f) Improving information-sharing within and among organizations, and harmonizing procedures, regulations and the use of resources and equipment;
- (g) Coordinating cooperation, especially with developing countries, on research and development of vaccines and diagnostic reagents, and between International Reference Laboratories and research institutions.

11. Recognising that the United Nations Secretary-General's investigative mechanism is an impartial and effective tool for investigating the alleged use of biological and toxin weapons that complements the provisions of the Convention, States Parties should encourage the Secretary-General to maintain and improve the mechanism, including by:

- (a) Updating and improving it to take into account developments in biological science and technology;
- (b) Building upon the highest level of expertise, both from experts and laboratories, provided by Member States of the United Nations;
- (c) Benefitting from closer technical collaboration with international partners for reviewing manuals, training and procedures as well as the provision of relevant support to an investigation by seconding experts, sharing necessary equipment, field experience, and lessons learned;
- (d) Receiving sustainable funding from Member States of the United Nations;
- (e) Publishing the updated appendices.

12. Recognizing that the role played by the International Health Regulations (2005) in building capacity to prevent, protect against, control and respond to the international spread of disease is consistent with objectives of the Convention, and that despite their different scopes and purposes, the effective implementation of both regimes can be mutually reinforcing, States Parties should consider the utility of the International Health Regulations as a means of building capacity for:

- (a) The early detection of disease events;
- (b) The provision of appropriate reactions based on well-founded risk assessments;
- (c) International cooperation and assistance;
- (d) Timely, accurate information exchange;
- (e) Technology exchanges in the field of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment.

Annex II

List of documents

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
BWC/MSP/2010/1	Provisional agenda – Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2010/2	2010 Report of the Implementation Support Unit – Submitted by the Implementation Support Unit
BWC/MSP/2010/3	Provisional programme of work – Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2010/4	Report of the Chairman on universalization activities – Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2010/5/Rev.1	Estimated costs of the Preparatory Committee and Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction – Note by the Secretariat
BWC/MSP/2010/6	Report of the Meeting of States Parties
BWC/MSP/2010/INF.1	Background information on scientific and technological developments that may be relevant to the Convention: report on an international workshop in Beijing – Submitted by the Implementation Support Unit
BWC/MSP/2010/INF.2 and Add.1 [English/French/Spanish only]	List of participants
BWC/MSP/2010/L.1	Synthesis of considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions on the topic under discussion at the Meeting of Experts – Submitted by the Chairman
BWC/MSP/2010/CRP.1 [English only]	Draft Report of the Meeting of States Parties
BWC/MSP/2010/MISC.1 [English/French/Spanish only]	Provisional list of participants
BWC/MSP/2010/WP.1 [English only]	Co-chairs' summary of the international workshop on "Strengthening International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of Biological Weapons: The Role of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention" – Submitted by China, Canada and the Implementation Support Unit
BWC/MSP/2010/WP.2 [English only]	Proposals to strengthen the existing confidence-building measure submission and review process – Submitted by Canada

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Title</i>
BWC/MSP/2010/WP.3/Rev.1 [English only]	National implementation of the BTWC: compliance assessment: a concept paper – Submitted by Canada
BWC/MSP/2010/WP.4 [English only]	Strengthening response capabilities in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons – Submitted by Japan on behalf of JACKSNNZ
BWC/MSP/2010/WP.5 [English only]	United States Government law enforcement efforts to strengthen cooperation and collaboration among security, health, and science communities – Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/MSP/2010/WP.6 [English only]	United States initiatives building on the 2007-2010 BWC work program – Submitted by the United States of America
BWC/MSP/2010/WP.7 [English only]	Timely pathogens diagnosis as a basis for preventing and minimizing epidemics of natural or intentional origin – Submitted by the Russian Federation
BWC/MSP/2010/WP.8 [English only]	Organization of prevention and elimination of potential outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases in the Russian Federation – Submitted by the Russian Federation
