

6. Other arrangements

While the BWC lies at the heart of the international regime governing the prohibition of biological weapons, other arrangements complement and strengthen the norm against the hostile use of disease. These arrangements, which range from informal groupings to more formally-constituted groups of States, tend to entail collective agreement to take or renounce certain actions to prevent BW proliferation. These arrangements are initiated by groups of like-minded States, rather than by widespread international consensus among States, as multilateral treaties are.

Australia Group

The Australia Group, which began work in 1984/85, seeks to harmonize supply-side controls on dual-use technology, including equipment, chemical agents and biological pathogens, applicable to chemical and biological warfare, by promoting common standards for the formation and implementation of national export-control policies. The Australia Group is one of the earliest plurilateral initiatives on non-proliferation, arising as a direct result of the discovery that the chemical weapons that Iraq used in its war with Iran had been manufactured using 'dual use' commodities and know-how imported from the global marketplace. During the 1980s, a number of countries implemented national export controls on certain chemical precursors, but these suffered from a lack of uniformity. Australia therefore proposed a meeting of countries with relevant export controls and the first meeting of what became the Australia Group took place in Brussels in June 1985. All subsequent plenary meetings until 2003 took place in the Australian Embassy in Paris, but from 2004 onwards meetings have taken place in the Kleber Centre in Paris (except the 20th anniversary meeting in 2005 which took place in Sydney).

Its membership and range of activities have expanded over the years, most notably in the early 1990s, when it expanded its scope to include biological export controls. Regarding BW proliferation, the Group now maintains lists of biological agents, plant pathogens and animal pathogens, in addition to a list of dual-use biological equipment. All four lists are included in this section of the Briefing Book. The Australia Group lists form the basis of the CBW-related sections of the European Union's dual-use goods regime, and they have been adopted as the basis for national export controls by many non-participating countries. The Australia Group now has 40 participating countries, plus the European Commission. All Australia Group participants are States Parties to both the BWC and CWC.

Group of Eight Nations

The Group of Eight Nations (G8) comprises eight major industrialised nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US) whose leaders meet annual to discuss issues of mutual concern. At their 2003 summit meeting in Evian, France, the G8 leaders adopted a declaration on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in which they described the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, together with the spread of international terrorism, as "the pre-eminent threat to international security." At each summit meeting since Evian, except for 2010, the G8 leaders have included reference to the BWC in their summit communiqué:

Summit	Year	BWC reference
Heiligendamm (Germany)	2007	Determined to exclude completely the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons, we welcome the outcome of the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC in 2006, which made a significant contribution to strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention. We are committed to fully comply with the decisions taken by that conference and to work for successful outcomes of the meetings during the intercessional period leading to the next Review Conference in 2011.
Tōyako (Japan)	2008	We are determined to make every effort to overcome the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means and to prevent acquisition of WMD by terrorists, by upholding, strengthening and universalizing all relevant multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament instruments...We welcome the current progress of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)... and reiterate the vital importance of their full and effective implementation.
L'Aquila (Italy)	2009	All States must meet in full their arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation commitments under relevant international treaties and multilateral arrangements. The universalization and reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime remains an urgent priority. We call upon all States still not party to the ... Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to accede without delay....We welcome the ongoing progress under the CWC and BTWC and highlight the vital importance of the full and effective implementation of both Conventions.
Deauville (France)	2011	<p>...we emphasize that strengthening of the BTWC regime plays a principal role in diminishing the threat of proliferation and acquisition of dangerous biological agents, deliberate misuse of life sciences and biotechnologies for development of biological and toxin weapons. The 7th BTWC Review Conference to be held in December 2011 in Geneva provides an opportunity to reaffirm the authority and increased relevance of this vital instrument for our collective security in an ever changing context....</p> <p>Aware of the importance of the intersessional work of the Convention to achieve this objective, we are determined to engage in discussions with all States Parties on a new and substantive work programme addressing the central issues of the Convention, including looking at more effective ways to enhance assurance of compliance with the BTWC as well as the implications of relevant scientific and technological developments for all appropriate articles of the Convention ...</p> <p>...We will also support the strengthening of the current UNSG mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 42/37.</p>

The G8 had launched the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction at its summit meeting in Kananaskis, Canada, in 2002 with an initial ten year mandate. The Global Partnership served to attract and provide a framework for international financing of the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists, initially in Russia (Ukraine has now also been accepted as a recipient country).

The Global Partnership has since broadened its objectives to include the development of measures for “international non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues”, including biosecurity projects and supportive activities in states beyond Russia that have renounced WMD. Recognising that proliferation and terrorist acquisition and use of weapons and materials of mass destruction are global security challenges, in 2008, G-8 Leaders agreed that the Global Partnership should implement projects worldwide on the basis of the Kananaskis principles and guidelines. Work is now being done in several regions of the world including Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Americas.

At Kananaskis, the G8 leaders committed to raising US\$20 billion to support such activities over the following ten years. By the 2011 summit, held in Deauville, France, 15 non-G8 countries had also joined the Global Partnership as donors (Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and the Ukraine).

The initial ten-year mandate for the Global Partnership ends in 2012. The 2010 summit meeting in Muskoka Canada had particular focus on the continuing Global Partnership. At that meeting the G8 nations welcomed

the concrete achievements and measurable results of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002, and we remain committed to completing priority projects in Russia. We recognize the continuing global threats before us, and we all recognize the importance of continuing our joint efforts as partners to address them in the years ahead. Toward that end, we ask our senior experts to evaluate the results of the Global Partnership to date, as a point of departure for developing options for programming and financing beyond 2012, focusing on nuclear and radiological security, bio security, scientist engagement and facilitation of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as well as the potential participation of new countries in the initiative.

The Global Partnership Working Group presented an assessment and options for future programming at the 2011 G8 meeting in Deauville France.